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NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS: FROM
PUBLIC TO PRIVATE AND BACK AGAIN
RALPH J. ROHNER*
Perspective
The response of sympathetic lawmakers to perceived
abuses in the consumer credit field is almost totally predicta-
ble. One group will urge the enactment of disclosure rules so
that well-informed consumers will be able to look out for them-
selves in the marketplace. Another group will urge the passage
of laws directly prohibiting the distasteful practice, or mandat-
ing a corrective mechanism. Both groups will then engage in
endless rhetorical debate over the costs and benefits of either
approach, the infringements on competition and marketplace
freedom, and the burdens on small business.'
All of these responses take for granted that the disappear-
ance of evil will automatically and immediately follow upon
the passage of a statute declaring evil unlawful. That is, the
legislators too often assume their fiats will be self-executing, or
largely so. Relatively little, and sometimes no, attention is
given to establishing enforcement mechanisms that will effec-
tively translate legislative wishes into marketplace realities.
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sumer Affairs, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate.
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tion and Welfare. From 1963-1964, he was a teaching assistant at Stanford Law School
in Stanford, California. He received his J.D. from the Catholic University of America
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1. This kind of debate is typified in the context of permissible finance charges in
consumer credit transactions. The NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, RE-
PORT, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCF
REPORT] devoted separate chapters to rate regulation and rate disclosure (Chapters 6
and 7 on regulation, Chapter 10 on disclosure); the latter chapter reviews the debate
in Congress over the desirability of either approach. The debate does not cease when
laws are enacted. See Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27
STAN. L. REV. 951 (1975).
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The burden of this paper, therefore, is to review some signifi-'
cant developments and trends in consumer credit enforcement
by public agencies. Administrative supervision is, to be sure,
but one approach to enforcement, but one which this writer
believes to have a reviving and vital role in safeguarding con-
sumers in credit transactions.
I. THE SETTING
The explosion of consumer credit laws and regulations over
the past decade is altogether unprecedented, both in the
amounts of new law created and in the diversity of its sources.
The lawmaking bodies include the fifty state legislatures, num-
bers of city and other local governments, the United States
Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve
Board, other federal and state agencies, and the courts.
Federal-State Legislation
The enactments nationwide are simply too numerous to
count, and their sheer number and range of coverage create
monumental enforcement problems. (How can an individual
consumer hope to keep an accurate and current catalog of all
his rights, or even of the disclosure statements describing
them? How can the finite staff of the FTC, the Federal Reserve
Board, or a state attorney general's office adequately monitor
all creditors for compliance with all applicable laws?) Even for
the single legislative body that is the United States Congress,
it is difficult to comprehend the extent of its entry into the
consumer credit regulatory field. Consider the following chro-
nology of congressional activity:
1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act,2 containing-
Title I: The Truth in Lending Act
Title II: Extortionate Credit Transactions
Title HI: Restrictions on Garnishments
Title IV: National Commission on Consumer Finance
1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act 3
Unsolicited Credit Card Amendments to TIL
1974 Fair Credit Billing Act'
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
3. Id. § 1681.
4. Id. § 1642.
5. Id. § 1666.
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Equal Credit Opportunity Act"
Truth in Lending Amendments'
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act"
1975 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act"
1976 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Amendments'
Discount-Surcharge Amendments to TIL"
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments"
Consumer Leasing Act'"
1977 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'4
Community Reinvestment Act'5
1978 Electronic Fund Transfers Act'
Right to Financial Privacy Act"
If anything, the pace is becoming more frenetic; and this is but
one lawmaking body. Still at the federal level, the Federal
Trade Commission has issued several sweeping trade regula-
tion rules affecting credit transactions, one requiring a cooling-
off period in door-to-door sales,' 8 another effectively abolishing
the holder-in-due-course doctrine," and the Commission has
an even more sweeping Credit Practices Rule' on the drawing
boards. The Federal Reserve Board has published hundreds of
official and unofficial interpretations of the regulations it has
issued under these laws.2
State activity has been highlighted by the promulgation of
an original and a revised Uniform Consumer Credit Code22
6. Id. § 1691.
7. Id. § 1601.
8. 12 id. §§ 2601-2617.
9. 15 id. 88 2301-2312.
10. 12 id. 88 2601-2617.
11. 15 id. § 1666f.
12. Id. § 1691.
13. Id. § 1667.
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692 (West Supp. 1978).
15. 12 id. §§ 2901-2905.
16. Title XX, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978).
17. Title XI, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978).
18. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1977).
19. Id. § 433.
20. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444).
21. Pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, for example, the Board issued Regula-
tion Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1977). That Regulation in turn provides for the issuance of
official Board interpretations, official staff interpretations, and unofficial staff inter-
pretations. Id. § 226.1(d). At this writing there have been about 60 Board interpreta-
tions, more than 150 official staff interpretations, and more than 1200 unofficial staff
letters.
22. The original UCCC was promulgated in 1969, the revised version in 1974.
19791
584 Oklahoma City University Law Review
which, though not widely adopted in their uniform versions,
have prompted a great deal of ad hoc legislative activity.2' To
begin to appreciate the enforcement implications of this state
and federal lawmaking, consider in the abstract how best to
assure compliance with a recent New York state law2 requiring
that all consumer credit contracts be written in simple, under-
standable English!
NCCF Report
In the midst of this maelstrom, the National Commission
on Consumer Finance issued its Report,2 in December, 1972,
seeking to draw together the experience of the past into a con-
sensus for the future. Its recommendations ranged broadly
from marketplace restructuring to very specific suggestions for
new or modified transactional protections for consumers. The
NCCF Report did not ignore enforcement altogether-an entire
chapter is devoted to "Supervisory Mechanisms."26 But like
much of the legislative debate, the Report seems to treat the
enforcement dimension as an insignificant appendage to more
substantive matters. Discrepancies in enforcement policies
among existing federal and state agencies are noted, and the
Report recommends equalizing or strengthening enforcement
powers for all agencies." But the bulk of the NCCF's discussion
is aimed at the question of which public agencies should be
responsible for enforcement, and not at the question of what
those agencies should do. The NCCF devotes no attention to
the relative strengths and weaknesses of private versus public
agency enforcement, except to recognize, poignantly, the plight
of the consumer left on his own:
23. Activity in the state legislatures was also influenced by the proposed National
Consumer Act, and its successor, the Model Consumer Credit Act, drafted by the
National Consumer Law Center in 1970 and 1973, respectively. See Davis, Legislative
Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study of the Negotiations and
Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REv. 3 (1973).
24. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978).
25. NCCF REPORT, supra note 1. The Commission was created by Title IV of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act in 1968.
26. Id. ch. 4.
27. For example, the Commission recommended allowing state officials to exam-
ine federally chartered institutions for compliance with state consumer laws, amending
state laws to bring second mortgage lenders under licensure controls, and amending
state laws to give a single agency authority to enforce consumer laws against all credit
grantors. Id. at 60-61.
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The absence of any administrative control on behalf of
the consumer means that retail credit laws are largely en-
forceable only by the victims of those who violate these laws.
Surely legislators cannot expect consumers who are so poor
and ingenuous as to be victimized in credit sales transactions
to be wealthy and sophisticated enough to initiate and fight
a lawsuit to a successful conclusion against usually well-
financed creditors. 28
There is no discussion of the various techniques a public agency
might bring to bear both to prevent recurrence of unlawful
practices and also to provide meaningful remedies for the con-
sumer victims of past practices. Yet it was precisely this kind
of lack of imagination that underlay much of the criticism of
the Federal Trade Commission in the Nader 9 and American
Bar Association 3 reports in the 1960's, criticism which has led
the Commission to test its own powers in recent years.
Until very recently, post-NCCF discussions of enforce-
ment strategies seem to assume that private enforcement is
and should be the dominant technique. Providing strong in-
ducements for individuals to vindicate their own rights was
introduced in the Truth in Lending Act at the federal level.'
The debate about the desirability of these inducements has
continued in connection with subsequent federal statutes, es-
pecially with respect to class action recoveries based on these
formulas. The lack of strong private enforcement in the original
Uniform Consumer Credit Code prompted strong criticism, 32
and the revised version more closely parallels the Truth in
Lending model.3 But as will be suggested below, enforcement
by private action has distinct limitations under the best of
circumstances; it may also be inadequate and at times counter-
productive in achieving the most efficient and widespread lev-
els of compliance. In any event no one appears to believe that
private enforcement should be the exclusive methodology
28. Id. at 48.
29. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
30. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE A.B.A. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
31. Truth in Lending Act § 130, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976).
32. E.g., Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code Es-
chew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039 (1968).
33. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.201 (1974 version).
1979]
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across the spectrum of federal and state consumer credit laws.
The question, therefore, remains open whether the role of the
public agency can be improved, in terms both of cost efficiency
and of producing real consumer protection.
Traditional Patterns of Agency Enforcement
As a further preface, it is worth noting the conventional
strictures within which public consumer protection agencies
have operated. For one, specially-formed consumer protection
offices are likely to be politically vulnerable institutions in the
sense that they must tangle with industries holding vested in-
terests and great economic power, on behalf of nondescript
customers having little economic clout. As a by-product, these
agencies are rarely adequately funded; they may be unable to
attract or retain the highest quality personnel and those on
board are usually spread terribly thin. Their resources will
often not permit regular, systematic examination of the prac-
tices of all the creditors under their supervision. This is cer-
tainly true of the Federal Trade Commission and probably also
of many state agencies, especially wit'h respect to retail sales
creditors not subject to licensing or regular examination. 4 This
circumstance makes the agency a responder rather than an
actor: it is dependent on an inflow of consumer complaints or
on the more or less accidental discovery of patterns of abuse.
In other cases the agency may be little more than a licensing
board, dominated by industry interests, with few resources and
even fewer enforcement tools."
In the case of deposit-holding creditors (banks, credit un-
ions, savings and loan associations), where the supervisory
agency does conduct regular and systematic examinations of
institutional practices, the problem is different. It is attitudi-
34. The NCFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 57-58, observed:
State legislatures in the last two decades have enacted countless con-
sumer protection statutes but have been reluctant to appropriate funds to
enlarge consumer protection agencies in order to enforce these laws. State
agencies usually have adequate financing only when creditors pay for exami-
nations, as with agencies examining deposit-holding institutions or consumer
finance companies.
35. This was the case with state supervision of independent debt collection agen-
cies, where the weaknesses in state enforcement provided the opening for congressional
enactment of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692); see H.R. REP. No. 95-131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
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nal. Bank examiners traditionally have been concerned pri-
marily with depositor and investor protection ("safety and
soundness") and not with borrower protection. Supervisors
occupying "good old boy" relationships with their banks were
not likely to take a hard line on consumer protection.
Most such agencies are further strapped by administrative
procedures which bog down the staff, dissipate resources, and
preclude quick, sharp action. 6 Even cases suitable for bringing
immediately to court for injunctive relief may require extensive
investigation and negotiation beforehand lest the agency risk
an embarrassing dismissal at the courthouse.
As limiting as any of the characteristics above may be,
none compare to the narrow form of relief typically available
to public agencies in the past. Using the FTC as an example,
the agency's sole internal remedy (beyond consent orders or
voluntary compliance) was the entry of an order directing a
specific violator to cease and desist from an unlawful practice.37
This was uniformly taken to mean that the agency could bar
future unlawful conduct, but could do virtually nothing in the
way of providing recompense for past victims. 38 It could not
even proscribe future conduct without producing substantial
evidence of explicit past violations. Respondents could modify
their practices somewhat-enough to take them outside of the
literal reach of the order-and otherwise continue as before. In
many cases, the entry of a cease and desist order might be an
empty victory for the agency, as in the case of advertising viola-
tions where the offensive advertising motif had long since been
discontinued.
Alternative remedies were too draconian to be of much
day-to-day use. For creditors holding federal or state charters
36. In the classic case of Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), it took 16 years to compel respondent to drop the mislead-
ing reference to "liver" in "Carter's Little Liver Pills." Rothschild and Carroll report
that delays of three to five years between issuance of an FTC complaint and final
issuance of a cease and desist order are not uncommon. D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL,
CONSUMER PROTECTION: TEXT AND MATERIALS 91 (1977). The Commission did not get
statutory authority to seek immediate injunctive relief until 1973, in a rider to the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 81 Stat. 577
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
37. See D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 36, §§ 3.07-.16; Kintner &
Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer
Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1975).
38. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
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or licenses, there is the threat of suspension, nonrenewal, or
revocation of that operating permit. Understandably, this rem-
edy has rarely been used.3 9 Criminal prosecutions of consumer
credit violators are similarly few and far between.4 0
It is thus not an exaggeration to suggest that public agency
capabilities in the past have not been conducive to thorough
and vigorous enforcement of consumer rights. In general those
agencies have considered themselves virtually powerless to do
more than restrain continuing abuses. In this light it is encour-
aging to note that some such agencies (sometimes with a boost
or a prod from the legislature) have begun to exhibit an ability
and a willingness to take a more active and imaginative en-
forcement role.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM
To gauge the need for strong and active agency enforce-
ment activity, one needs to accept some premises. The starting
point is that existing consumer credit protection laws are worth
enforcing-that is, they will provide genuine benefits to con-
sumers if enforced. To be sure, this may be a debatable propo-
sition in the context of legislative consideration of specific mea-
sures. 1 But once legislative standards are on the books, and
until they are amended or repealed, they deserve the benefit of
any doubt when it comes to establishing enforcement policies.
Certainly the justification for many consumer protection rules,
such as prohibitions of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
or of discrimination in credit granting, are beyond question.
The remainder of this article, therefore, will not dispute that
39. But see Miller, Enforcement of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Observa-
tions from the Oklahoma and Federal Experience, 51 N.C. L. REv. 1229, 1259-60
(1973), where Professor Miller reported that eight revocation or suspension of license
proceedings had been commenced in Oklahoma since enactment of the UCCC. See also
Note, Administration of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 8 IND. L. REV. 828 (1975);
Comment, Deceptive Trade Practices in the Marketplace: Consumer Protection by the
New York Government Agencies, 3 FORD. URB. L.J. 491 (1975).
40. The Truth in Lending Act, which has produced a torrent of civil litigation,
also provides for criminal sanctions. Truth in Lending Act § 112, 15 U.S.C. § 1611
(1976). There are no reported cases of criminal prosecutions for Truth in Lending
violations.
41. Enactment into law obviously does not cloak consumer protection measures
with infallibility either. Witness the congressional turn-around on the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act. See Rohner, Consumer Credit Legislation in the 94th
Congress-and a Look Ahead, 9 UCC L.J. 307, 345-49 (1977).
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the goals of consumer credit laws are in fact desirable.
A second premise is that victimized consumers cannot
always protect their rights on their own. There will inevitably
be occasions for consumers engaging in marketplace credit
transactions to encounter violations of existing standards, vio-
lations resulting from creditor ignorance of the law, from inad-
vertance, or from malice. For our purposes the motive of the
creditor is irrelevant (though it may affect the appropriateness
of a given remedy) if the consumer has in fact been subjected
to an unlawful practice. If the consumer discovers the depriva-
tion of rights, what can he or she do about it? The consumer
may plead, negotiate, and demand correction from the credi-
tor,4" but with little leverage or bargaining power and perhaps
with no obvious corrective remedy. (Consider the consumer
who responds to a bait-and-switch sales pitch and ends up with
a more expensive, but better quality, vacuum cleaner. What
are the damages?) Where the stakes are more substantial and
more measurable-as where the creditor improperly forecloses
on collateral-the consumer is unlikely to make much progress
seeking an informal correction. An alternative is litigation with
the creditor, but the consumer's obstacles here are numerous
and obvious. They consist of all the disincentives for litigation
over modest dollar amounts: the need to retain counsel, litiga-
tion costs and delays, the uncertainty of victory, and the diffi-
culties of collecting a sufficient judgment to cover damages and
the litigation costs themselves. The consumer who knows he
has been victimized but who rationally chooses not to litigate
is left with nothing but a festering sense of resentment. 3
Even the courageous individual who presses his rights to
the hilt and prevails adds little to the breadth of the enforce-
ment power. Though that consumer may be made whole, his
victory may do little or nothing to dissuade the creditor from a
pattern of unlawful conduct. Indeed, a creditor may be willing
to settle generously with the occasional consumer who asserts
his rights, in the expectation that many other consumer vic-
tims will not be so resourceful. Unless unusually altruistic, the
42. See generally Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem Solving Mechanism,
12 LAW & Soc. REV. 199 (1978).
43. It is worth recalling that the landmark Kerner Commission Report in 1968
identified fraudulent marketplace practices as a source of great resentment and as one
of the causes of urban civil unrest. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 139-40 (1968).
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consumer who litigates for his personal remedy is unlikely to
seek the added remedy of enjoining the creditor's unlawful
course of conduct. This could involve litigation complexities
and risks not commensurate with the consumer's immediate
goal. Thus individual consumer victories through litigation do
not necessarily translate into effective deterrents of future
abuses. And the fact remains that the litigated abuse ought not
to have occurred in the first place.
For the larger numbers of consumers who never realize
that their creditors have acted unlawfully, reliance on enforce-
ment through private suits is a fortiori futile. It is the nature
of deceptive practices to go undetected; abuses associated with
consumer credit transactions may be quite subtle and viola-
tions (for example of Truth in Lending) unapparent except on
the closest scrutiny by expert counsel." There is of course some
possibility that latent violations will turn up when the con-
sumer defaults and engages counsel to defend a collection ac-
tion,45 but this merely places the consumer back in a position
of knowing that he is a victim. All the obstacles and disincen-
tives to a remedy remain.
The problem, therefore, is that to leave the consumer to
his own devices in the current environment of extensive, com-
plex, and multi-jurisdictional credit laws is to leave him with-
out rights. His exposed situation might be compared to that of
a crime-infested city without policemen, likely to produce more
innocent victims than rugged individualists capable of self-
defense.
III. THE INADEQUACIES OF NON-AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
To pursue the analogy in the previous paragraph a step
further, it might theoretically be possible to provide the citi-
zenry with additional protections without maintaining a large,
expensive, and bureaucratic police force, either through kinds
of "vigilante" groups or by giving individuals better weapons
for their own protection. Efforts in these directions in the con-
sumer credit enforcement area have not been notably success-
ful-probably for many of the same reasons that true vigilantes
44. Cf. Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 669, 680-
83 (1977) (description of this pattern in the Truth in Lending context).
45. Id. at 671-76.
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and concealed pistols have faded from the law enforcement
scene.
Voluntary Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms
Little can be said about the possible utility of industry-
sponsored arbitration or similar voluntary dispute-settlement
techniques, because little has been tried in the credit area.
Arbitration tribunals are available under the auspices of the
Better Business Bureaus in many areas,4" and presumably are
open to the hearing of credit disputes. This writer is simply
unaware of any extensive use of them in this regard, nor is he
aware of any credit-industry review panels such as exist in
several of the sales fields. No effort has been made in any
consumer credit legislation to encourage the establishment of
industry mechanisms, such as was done in the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act.47
A more obvious potential aid to correcting violations of law
is each creditor's concern for customer relations. Few conscien-
tious creditors enjoy the notoriety of mention in a local "Action
Line" column; even fewer enjoy defending a law suit (or justify-
ing that expense to their board of directors). The answer-for
those creditors who can afford the luxury-is the maintenance
of a complaint office or desk which is managed honestly and
forthrightly, as well as the maintenance of a high level of qual-
ity control in training, supervising, and supplying credit per-
sonnel. For plastic card issuers there are some legal induce-
ments in this direction in the provisions of the Fair Credit
Billing Act 48 and the recent Electronic Fund Transfers Act4"
which spell out certain dispute-settlement procedures.
The trouble with these essentially voluntary enforcement
devices is that they tend to exist where they are least needed.
The large bank or retailer may feel it cannot afford not to use
available arbitration or maintain a full-time complaint officer,
but the smaller creditor's business volume may not justify such
efforts. Voluntary devices suffer the further frailty that they are
46. See Jones, Wanted: A New System for Solving Consumer Grievances, 25 ARB.
J. 234, 239-40 (1970), reprinted in D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 872-75 (1975), for
a description of other organizations which sponsor arbitration panels.
47. Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act §
110(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (1976).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.14 (1977).
49. Title XX, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978).
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geared to ad hoc resolutions and do not serve a strong deterrent
or preventive function.
Distinct mention should be made here of a sort of
"ombudsman" function performed by many public enforce-
ment agencies: acting on individual consumer complaints.
While this function is clearly an adjunct to their overall en-
forcement responsibilities, it leaves the agency considerable
leeway to use conciliation, negotiation, compromise, and other
essentially voluntary adjustment techniques. It is noteworthy
that the Uniform Consumer Credit Code expressly authorizes
the Administrator to "receive and act on complaints.""' Recent
federal legislation imposes an even more explicit duty on the
bank regulatory agencies to "establish a separate division of
consumer affairs which shall receive and take appropriate ac-
tion upon complaints." ' 51 Still, other supervisory agencies, in-
cluding the FTC, have not shown any inclination to engage in
case-by-case dispute-settlement activity (perhaps because of
the sheer volume of incoming complaints), but presumably do
use complaints as a basis for initiating formal enforcement
proceedings or for evaluating license or charter applications.
The point is that the resources of public enforcement agencies
may lend themselves to achieving amicable, voluntary settle-
ments in many cases, where the agency acts in only a quasi-
official arbitrator's role.
Private Judicial Enforcement
The suggestion is made above that under even the best
circumstances enforcement of consumer credit laws through
private lawsuits can have only a limited effectiveness. It pre-
sumes in every case a consumer cognizant of his rights and
willing to take the initiative and the considerable risks of litiga-
tion.
Awareness of these barriers has led to a number of efforts
to make private enforcement more palatable. (Some of these
efforts run far beyond the bounds of consumer credit protec-
tion.) One example is the attempt to revitalize the system of
small claims courts so that consumers can obtain judicial re-
50. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.104(i)(a) (1974 version).
51. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(f)(1), as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 57a
(1976).
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view of their claims conveniently, expeditiously, and cheaply.52
There is no doubt that progress has been made in making small
claims courts suitable for consumer redress as well as creditor
collections, but these courts are confined by their own parame-
ters. They have limited jurisdictions, may be no more accessi-
ble than the regular courts, and may be conducted by judges
more disposed to assembly-line processing of cases, or to com-
promise settlements, than to careful protection of consumer
rights.
The Truth in Lending Experience
A signal effort was made in the Truth in Lending Act to
bring individual consumers into the enforcement picture; expe-
rience under that Act therefore offers a base from which to
estimate the maximum possible scope of private enforcement.
First, the Act imposes liability without fault: virtually any
noncompliance with the complex disclosure rules is a viola-
tion.53 Second, the consumer who proves a violation recovers
any actual damages plus twice the finance charge in the trans-
action (but no more than $1000 and no less than $100).11 Third,
the consumer is entitled as well to attorney's fees and costs. 5
Finally, the action can be brought in any federal district court
without regard to jurisdictional amount.5"
It was clearly Congress' intent to make each consumer
debtor a mini-policeman of the statutory disclosure scheme,
and the inducements were designed for that purpose as well as
to take some of the enforcement burden off existing line agen-
cies. What the law has produced, however, may bear little re-
semblance to what Congress envisioned. Truth in Lending has
become a volcanic source of litigation, with case filings recently
running at better than 2000 per year in the federal courts
52. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REPORT, REDRESS OF
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES (1973); Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mecha-
nisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 (1971); Wexler, Court-Order Consumer
Arbitration, 28 Arb. J. 175 (1973).
53. Section 130(a) of the Act imposes liability on "any creditor who fails to comply
with any requirement," without reference to motive, intent, or exercise of care. Subsec-
tion 130(c) does provide a "bona fide error" defense for creditors, but this has' been
narrowly read to include only clerical errors. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1), (2)(A)(i) (1976).
55. Id. § 1640(a)(3).
56. Id. § 1640(e).
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alone.57 Rarely if ever do consumers prove any actual damages
resulting from the disclosure violations. Indeed, it is virtually
incontrovertible that most TIL lawsuits originate not in the
consumer's discovery of a disclosure defect but in the cus-
tomer's default or other dispute with the creditor that leads the
consumer to a lawyer who finds an actual or arguable TIL
violation which becomes the consumer's sword or shield in the
ensuing litigati6n1 s
The volume of this litigation had led courts into more and
more arcane constructions of the Act,5" into conflicting inter-
pretations, 0 and into outright disagreement6 with the Federal
Reserve Board, which has regulatory responsibility for the Act.
For individual creditors it has led to constant apprehension
about liability and to recurrent reprinting of disclosure forms
to keep pace with judicial developments. At the legislative
level, it has led Congress to enact a unique provision under
which a creditor may get a so-called "blessed letter" from the
Federal Reserve Board staff which protects him from liability
so long as he does as the letter advises.2 It has also led the
Senate, in a recently passed TIL Simplification bill, to reduce
both the number of required disclosures and the kinds of viola-
tions that will support an award of damages.13
The Congress, back in 1968, also failed to consider the
potential use of the class action device in conjunction with the
TIL formula for damages. Consumers' lawyers did not overlook
the possibilities for long, however, and what has ensued has
been a running skirmish between creditors desperately trying
to'avoid large penalty awards and consumers seeking minimum
57. Data supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is
reported in CAPITOL REPORTS, INC., WASHINGTON CREDIT LETrER 45 (Nov. 28, 1977).
58. See Landers, supra note 44.
59. For example, may a creditor use a subtractional sequence for his disclosures,
or must they be in additive form? See Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 2465 (1976).
60. On the question, for example, whether an acceleration clause is a default
charge, compare Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.
1975) with Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977) and McDaniel v.
Fulton Nat'l Bank, 543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 526 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1976), a/I'd on
rehearing, 544 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 934 (1977).
62. 15 U.S.C. 1640(f) (1976); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(3) (1975)
(amended 1976).
63. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see S. REP. No. 95-720, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978).
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recoveries multiplied by the total number of the creditor's cus-
tomers. The advantage seems to have shifted back and forth.
After several courts had perfunctorily certified class actions
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal
judge calculated the stakes in an action brought against a bank
by a class of 130,000 credit card holders.64 The judge found that
a possible $13,000,000 judgment against the bank for what was
a relatively harmless error was intolerable and refused to cer-
tify the class on that basis. This landmark decision slowed the
rate of class certifications.
To retain the enforcement threat represented by a class
action, but also to protect creditors from possibly
"annihilating" recoveries, Congress responded by setting a
ceiling on the amount recoverable in a TIL class suit: $100,000
or one percent of the creditor's net worth, whichever is less.,'
Two years later, apparently fearful they had closed the door too
far, Congress upped the ceiling to $500,000.6 This, together
with class action restrictions from other quarters, 7 at least pre-
vented an eruption of large class recoveries-for a while. Then
in an interesting case, in which the court used a mathematical
probability formula to compute actual damages to class mem-
bers, it also entered what appears to be the first TIL class
action award of civil penalties. And the court awarded the
maximum amount, $100,000.18
More ominous, from a creditor's point of view, is a later
case from the federal district court in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina.66 Finding numerous violations in a chain department
store's disclosure statement, the court awarded the full
$100,000 ceiling amount to a class of some 700 customers of one
branch store. The court justified its maximum award in part
64. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
65. TILA § 130(a)(2)(B) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a) (1974)).
66. TILA § 13(a)(2)(B) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(3) (1976)). All
these developments are discussed and carefully analyzed in Comment, Truth in Lend-
ing and the Federal Class Action, 22 VmL. L. REv. 418 (1977). See also LeValley &
Walker, Truth in Lending Class Actions Under Amended Section 130, 24 KAN. L. REv.
471 (1976); Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and Pro-
posed Alternatives, 27 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1974).
67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Supreme Court held that
class plaintiffs must bear the expense of notifying class members).
68. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972), motion granted,
71 F.R.D. 334 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
69. Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 42 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
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on the ground that the store had used the same forms in all
forty-eight of its branches (thus affecting a lot of people). What
the court did not acknowledge is that this would automatically
leave the department store chain exposed to forty-eight sepa-
rate judgments for $100,000 in favor of the customers of each
of its outlets! Although the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded on the question of the appropriate measure of dam-
ages,70 class actions for civil penalties may still be something
of an uncontrolled beast in the Truth in Lending area.
It is difficult to know exactly what to make of the Truth
in Lending experience. It has created private enforcement with
a vengeance and has generated amazingly intense creditor dis-
favor. Regretably, and importantly, it does not seem to have
greatly improved the level of compliance, if the continuing vol-
ume of litigation is a measure. The cases seem to feed on one
another: the answer to one interpretational question begets two
more. This pattern seems to make TIL allegations a.favorite
technique of consumer lawyers, whether their clients feel par-
ticularly aggrieved by the violation or not.7' The combination
of all these factors provide every incentive for at least knowl-
edgeable consumers to use TIL suits for purposes other than
the remedying of the disclosures themselves. The TIL experi-
ence may, therefore, be somewhat aberrational and not a reli-
able gauge of the optimal utility of private enforcement.
Other Statutory Examples
Several other federal statutes, also parts of the CCPA
umbrella, provide useful comparisons to Truth in Lending with
respect to private enforcement. All of them, like TIL, contain
a basic division of enforcement authority between existing pub-
lic agencies and individual consumers, but the specific induce-
ments to private suits are quite different.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act provides the sharpest con-
trast. Consumers may sue in federal court without regard to
jurisdictional amount, and if successful may recoup their attor-
ney's fees and court costs." But there the resemblance to Truth
in Lending ends. Liability exists only where there is fault (neg-
70. Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978).
71. Landers, supra note 44, at 677-79.
72. Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 616(3), 617(2), 618, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(3),
1681o(2), 1681p (1976).
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ligent or willful noncompliance)," and for negligence the mea-
sure of recovery is limited to actual damages. In addition the
Act authorizes no interpretive regulations, so there is not an
overlay of complex requirements comparable to TIL's Regula-
tion Z. Not surprisingly, litigation under FCRA has been rela-
tively scarce, and the cases reflect rather more substantive
than technical disputes about the Act's requirements and the
existence of actual injury.74
One might think that legislation such as the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, aimed as it is at discrimination in granting
credit, would prompt some litigation born out of emotion as
well as out of cold calculation of statutory rights. But ECOA
litigation, in the first three and one-half years of the Act's
existence, has been scant." This is doubly surprising because
the Act's legislative history incorporates the "effects test" from
the employment discrimination area, through which the ag-
grieved customer establishes a prima facie case by showing
statistically less favorable treatment of protected groups.7" The
Act also permits recoveries up to $10,000 in individual ac-
tions,77 compared to TIL's ceiling of $1,000. Part of the explana-
tion for the lack of litigation undoubtedly lies in the newness
of the Act. But a more solid reason lies in one simple facet of
the implementing regulation: it provides model application
forms which creditors can use with assurance that they are in
compliance.78 Thus the law takes out of ECOA plaintiffs' hands
the most effective weapon their TIL counterparts have-
defective forms; also, under ECOA the application forms are
filled in (most likely) by the consumer, while it is the creditor
who must execute and deliver the TIL disclosures. Thus sub-
stantive differences, newness, and approved forms set ECOA
73. Id. §§ 616, 617, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
74. See Note, Judicial Construction of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: Scope and
Civil Liability, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (1976).
75. Reported cases include Smith v. Lakeside Foods, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 171 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977).
76. See Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) n.7 (1977); S. REP. No. 94-589, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1975). That
legislative history cites explicitly to the equal employment cases of Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
An unsuccessful attempt was made to invoke the "effects test" in Carroll v. Exxon Co.,
U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977).
77. Equal Credit Opportunity Act § 706(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976).
78. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202, app. B (1977).
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apart from TIL, and probably mean there will never be a TIL-
like torrent of ECOA lawsuits.
Two other examples underscore Congress' uncertainty
about the ideal combination of inducements for private en-
forcement. The recently passed Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act 9 mirrored the TIL formula, with two exceptions: the $100
minimum recovery was dropped (to discourage bounty
hunters?), and there was an explicit prohibition of any elabora-
tive regulations or trade regulation rules.80 The 1976 Consumer
Leasing Act also adopted the TIL formula, but again with two
novel gimmicks: the statute of limitations for private suits runs
for one year from the termination of the lease,8 not from the
time of the violation as under TIL; and injured consumers may
sue for lease advertising violations,82 contrary to the rule for
TIL credit advertising violations which can only be policed by
a public agency. 3
Some further confirmation for the uniqueness of the TIL
experience can be drawn from the relative scarcity of case law
under state laws containing explicit inducements to private
litigants very much like those in TIL. We may speculate that
the reason for the dearth of private suits in those states is the
presence of strong administrative enforcement and resulting
high levels of compliance. We may also surmise that the TIL
litigation explosion, while an impressive indication of how the
right combination of circumstances can bring individual con-
sumers into enforcement roles in droves, is an atypical, dis-
torted image of what private enforcement should look like.
79. Act of Sept. 20, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (adding a new Title
VIII to the Consumer Credit Protection Act) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1692).
80. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act §§ 813(a)(2)(A), 814(d), 15 U.S.C.A. §§
1692k(a)(2)(A), 16921(d) (West Supp. 1978).
81. Consumer Leasing Act § 185(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1667d(c) (1976).
82. Id. § 185(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1667d(b).
83. Section 130 of the Truth in Lending Act provides a private cause of action only
for violations of chapters 2, 4 and 5 of the Act. The advertising provisions are in chapter
3. See Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 442 F.2d 78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 870 (1971).
84. For example, there appear to be no more than a half-dozen reported cases
under the Wisconsin Consumer Act. See [1977] 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) il
98,072; 98,073; 98,146; 98,452; 98,698; 98,716. The first case to reach that state's su-
preme court was Wachal v. Ketterhagen Motor Sales, 81 Wis. 2d 605, 260 N.W.2d 770
(1977).
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Implying a Private Remedy
Not all statutory consumer protections provide an explicit
private remedy, of any kind. For an individual consumer to
avail himself of anything from violations of such laws, that
consumer must persuade a court not only that the creditor's
actions are in fact in violation but also that a private remedy
is implied in the statutory scheme, either through legislative
history or as a judicially-recognized adjunct. Consumers have
had only occasional successes in these arguments.
Examples of legislation which carry no built-in private
remedy are manifold. State laws regulating small loans and
credit sales often left the consumer's obligation unaffected by
the creditor's failure to comply, in favor of criminal sanctions
or exclusive administrative enforcement." The original version
of the UCCC was in this mold, and criticism of this reliance on
policing by public agencies led to the inclusion of much
stronger private remedies in the revised version. In some con-
texts, however, such as with a state law requiring auto repair-
men to give binding estimates, courts have recognized the need
for, and the implied legislative approval of, a private remedy. 7
At the federal level, this pursuit of a private remedy has pro-
duced a split in the case law with respect to the anti-firing
provisions in the CCPA's garnishment title.m
The most pervasive source of potential implied private
rights lies in the FTC Act's broad proscriptions against unfair
or deceptive acts or practices, augmented by the volumes of
case-by-case adjudications of those standards. But it is pre-
cisely here, where private actions might fruitfully reinforce the
Commission's own enforcement efforts, that courts have
balked. With the recent exception of a single federal district
court," whose holding was itself rejected shortly thereafter,"1 '
the courts have consistently refused to permit private recover-
85. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION 42-44, 117-18 (1965).
86. Compare UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.202 (1969 version) with id. §
5.201 (1974 version); see Spanogle, supra note 32.
87. Bennett v. Hayes, 53 Cal. App. 3d 700, 125 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1975).
88. Compare Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974) with West-
ern v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. W.Va. 1973).
89. Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
90. Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.C. 1976); Bott v.
Holiday Universal, Inc., [19761 2 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cases) 69,301.
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ies premised on violations of the FTC Act."' Presumably these
holdings would carry over as well to creditor conduct violating'
the specific terms of a trade regulation rule. This could then
produce the anomalous result that if a creditor failed to include
the FTC anti-holder-in-due-course notice in a credit agree-
ment, the creditor might be prosecuted by the Commission but
the consumer might also have to pay a third-party financer who
qualified for holder-in-due-course status under state law. 2
Being judicially created rather than statutorily author-
ized, private enforcement by "implication" would carry addi-
tional disabilities. It is doubtful the consumer could recover
anything more than provable actual damages; recent Supreme
Court opinions also make it very unlikely the consumer could
recoup attorney's fees and costs without a statutory directive."3
Short of amending the FTC Act in this regard, the only way of
giving individual consumers the benefit of the FTC's experi-
ence is by state enactment of."little FTC" acts which explicitly
adopt FTC rulings as standards of deceptiveness or unfairness,
and which provide a state-law private remedy. 4
Either technique-implying a private remedy or incorpo-
rating federal standards by reference-smacks of being a back
door entry for private enforcement. None of the extant ap-
proaches, including the wide-open one in Truth in Lending,
comes close to making private enforcement an efficient or uni-
versally usable remedial technique. None of these approaches
significantly aids the consumer in recognizing his rights in the
first place; none offers the inducement of counsel fees or expen-
ses if the case is settled short of trial; all leave the consumer
with most of the disincentives of any civil litigation: expense,
uncertainty, delay, and the possible inappropriateness of any
remedy.
The discussion to this point has stressed the weaknesses of
private enforcement and the futility of relying on it as the
exclusive or dominant enforcement mode. This is certainly not
to say that private enforcement has no importance. Where the
91. Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92. This result would probably be more theoretical than real, for any competent
consumer lawyer ought to be able to make a persuasive argument that a financer who
knowingly purchases consumer paper without the required FTC notice is acting in bad
faith.
93. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1974).
94. E.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcTIcEs Acr §§ 1(4), 11(b).
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stakes are high enough private litigation cannot only vindicate
private rights but can produce a distinct (albeit uneven) polic-
ing effect on creditor conduct. At the other extreme, there are
many forms of unlawful creditor conduct for which a private
remedy is arguably wholly inappropriate-noncompliance with
administrative record-keeping requirements, for example.
And in the middle is that probably vast number of instances
where a creditor is violating the law but where the measurable
injury to individual consumers is small or speculative, and
where no amount of tinkering with the incentives for private
litigation can produce a consistent deterrent or corrective ef-
fect. This must be the role of the public agency.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF NOVEL AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
TECHNIQUES
To return to an earlier metaphor, just as police carrying
only billy clubs would be ill-equipped to deal with the full
range of criminal activity-from parking violations to embez-
zlement to insurrection-so also would a consumer protection
agency be ill-armed if its only weapon were the conventional,
prospective-only cease and desist order. The last decade has
seen occasions for agencies to try out new weaponry, some
forged in their own shops, some requisitioned from the legisla-
tive arsenal. Together these occurrences signify an expanding,
flexible, adaptive enforcement strategy.
Stung by criticisms from outside evaluators, the Federal
Trade Commission began in the late 1960's to add distinctive
and novel ingredients to its litigated orders. Tackling credit
advertising abuses by a low-income market retailer, the Com-
mission ordered the respondent not only to cease and desist the
deceptive advertising practices, but also affirmatively to dis-
close, orally and in writing, a variety of factors relating to credit
charges. This affirmative disclosure order was upheld in the
face of the creditor's argument that the recently enacted Truth
in Lending Act set the bounds for mandatory credit term dis-
closures.9 5
Similar instances of mandatory disclosure appeared in
cases challenging the fairness of a creditor's routine discount-
ing of consumer credit obligations to holders in due course's and
95. Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
96. All-State Indus. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970).
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a door-to-door bait-and-switch sales plan for vacuum clean-
ers. 7 In each case the Commission directed that subsequent
contracts contain explicit disclosures aimed at alerting con-
sumers to the risks involved.
In yet another case,9 8 involving high pressure sales of dance
lessons, the Commission's order forbade the seller from taking
contracts for dollar amounts above a specified figure-on the
theory that this would reduce the incentive for deceptive tac-
tics and afford consumers easier opportunities to terminate the
contractual relationship.
Nor were these first signs of more aggressive agency en-
forcement limited to the FTC. A number of state consumer
protection officials undertook elaborate prosecutions of con-
sumer frauds, in the course of which they sought and obtained
new forms of relief. In New Jersey, for example, the attorney
general successfully sued for declaratory, injunctive, and resti-
tutionary relief on behalf of a class of consumers victimized by
unconscionable door-to-door sales practices.9 In New York,
the attorney general enjoined a referral/pyramid sales scheme
in a landmark case, I°0 while the New York City Department of
Consumer Affairs was less conspicuously conjuring up respon-
ses to the most insidious kinds of fraudulent practices. 0' An
evaluation of the first several years experience in a UCCC state
indicated that administrative enforcement was generally
strong and not at all hesitant to seek even the drastic remedies
of license revocation in appropriate cases. 02
By the early 1970's, the Federal Trade Commission had
asserted broad remedial powers, including corrective advertis-
ing, restitution, and trade regulation rule-making. These and
other agency devices merit a closer look, both as examples of
imaginative agency enforcement devices and as precursors for
more of the same.
97. Household Sewing Mach. Co., 77 F.T.C. 1186 (1969).
98. Arthur Murray Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971). See also Kugler v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 216, 293 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972).
100. State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
101. For a colorful description of the enforcement activities of the New York
department in the 1970-1971 period see P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED:
CASE STUDIES IN CONSUMER FRAUD (1972).
102. Miller, Enforcement of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Observations
from the\Oklahoma and Federal Experience, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1229 (1973).
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1. Undoing Deceptive Advertising
In a series of cases culminating in Warner-Lambert v.
FTC, ,03 the Commission has established its power to order an
advertiser to ameliorate the residual effects of past deceptive
advertising by incorporating corrective messages in future ads.
Though not often used in connection with credit advertising,
perhaps due to the severe restrictions imposed on credit adver-
tisements by the Truth in Lending Act and the resulting dimi-
nution of such advertising, the threat and the burden of correc-
tive advertising orders are clearly a part of the FTC armory.
The novelty of this technique lies in large measure in its
attempt to undo past violations. Its implementation does not
require statistical proof of actual deception or the measure-
ment of individual consumer damages. Its premise is that the
lingering effects of past ad campaigns (which may change only
slightly in dropping their deceptive aspects) can best be miti-
gated by "confessional" ads over a similar period of time or
involving similar expenditures.0 4
Two possibly ominous clouds hanging over the corrective
advertising device have recently been dispelled. Certiorari has
been denied in the Warner-Lambert case,'05 where the grounds
asserted were that corrective advertising is outside the Com-
mission's limited powers (the court of appeals was divided on
this point) and that corrective advertising orders infringed on
first amendment rights.0 6 This latter question is too complex
to explore here, except to note an increasing insistence by the
103. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
104. The order approved in Warner-Lambert requires the company to expend a
sum on corrective advertising equivalent to the average annual Listerine advertising
budget during the 10 years preceding the order, approximately 10 million dollars. Id.
at 753, [19771 2 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cases) 72,255.
105. Cross-petitions for certiorari were denied in Docket Nos. 77-855 and 77-1118.
46 U.S.L.W. 3613 (April 4, 1978).
106. Judge Robb, dissenting in the court of appeals, noted that the 1975 amend-
ments to the FTC Act, contained in Pub. L. No. 93-637, expressly gave the courts
power to order "public notification" concerning violations. From this he deduced that
"at least in the judgment of the Congress the Commission does not have, and is not
intended to have, the power to order 'public notification' by way of corrective advertis-
ing." 562 F.2d at 765, [1977] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cases) 72,256.
Though the court had disposed of the freedom of speech question in its original
opinion, Warner-Lambert sought rehearing on the issue. Without granting the rehear-
ing the court issued a supplemental opinion again upholding the corrective advertising
order. Id. at 768, [1977] 2 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cases) 72,652.
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Supreme Court that even commercial advertising is entitled to
basic free-speech protections. 07
2. Mandating Protective Contract Provisions
Instead of merely prohibiting the future use of contract
provisions found to be unfair or deceptive, the FTC has in
several instances specified in its orders that certain contractual
provisions favorable to consumers (usually a right to cancel) be
included in subsequent agreements. 0° This technique, which
might be called "contracts of adhesion in reverse," is a direct
response to the felt inequality of bargaining power between
consumers and creditors; its effect is necessarily prospective
only, in the sense that prior customers get no immediate relief
from the order.
The more significant instances of an enforcement agency
dictating contract terms to creditors have occurred not in the
context of individual cases and specific orders, but rather as
parts of trade regulation rules. Since this form of rule-making
is a novel enforcement technique on its own, it is discussed
separately below.
3. Consumer Redress: Restitution
As noted above, several state attorneys general have suc-
cessfully obtained court orders for restitution to consumers of
amounts taken from them through deceptive practices. The
Federal Trade Commission also has tried its hand at ordering
restorative relief and has had its authority in this regard par-
tially affirmed in legislation. And, more recently, the hitherto
dormant bank regulatory agencies have shown signs of adopt-
ing an aggressive policy of ordering restitution of overcharges
by creditor banks. The availability of a corrective remedy is the
most portentious of all the recent developments, for it breaks
107. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
The denial of certiorari in Warner-Lambert does not mean the FTC is altogether
out from under the first amendment cloud. See National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v.
FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), supplemental opinion, 570 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1978),
[19781 1 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cases) 73,677, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 86 (1978).
108. See, e.g., Household Sewing Mach. Co., 77 F.T.C. 1186 (1969). Mandatory
contract provisions also continue to appear in Commission consent orders. See, e.g.,
Driver Training Inst., Inc., [1978] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,387; American
Consumer Serv., Inc., [1977] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,278.
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the shackles of the traditional cease and desist order as the
exclusive agency enforcement device.
The FTC
As early as 1971 the FTC began the process of creating a
new enforcement dimension for itself, by asserting the author-
ity to order restitution to consumers in appropriate cases."'"
This assertion was not only adventurous on the Commission's
part, it was a sharp and striking departure from all prior under-
standing about the Commission's limited enforcement role.
Without rejecting the notion that the agency's role was not to
punish or penalize respondents for past conduct, but rather to
assure -the cessation of unfair or deceptive practices, the Com-
mission rationalized that at times the only effective way to
prevent future violations was to deprive the violator of the
fruits of previous unlawful conduct."'
The Commission first found such a case in the activities
of Universal Credit Acceptance Corporation, a company which
had prospered by misrepresenting the nature of its quasi-credit
card franchises. The resulting order"' not only enjoined future
deceptions and required a seven-day cooling off period in all
future contracts, but further required refunds of franchise fees
and membership dues to all customers in the preceding six
years.
The agency's victory was short-lived, however, for on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit that court, in Heater v. FTC,"'
declared restitutionary orders ultra vires for the Commission.
The Commission's first response was to fight, and it issued a
109. Curtis Publishing Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
11 19,719.
110. The Commission justified its authority by stating:
It may well be that in some situations injury to competition resulting
from the deceptive practice cannot be adequately remedied by an order
which merely enjoins the practice. In such a case refunding of the money
obtained by illegal means may be the only effective method of restoring the
competitive status quo which was disrupted by the deceptive practice . . ..
While directed at past acts, such an order would be prospective in its effect
since it would be designed to restore competition.
Id. 11 19,719, at 21,758.
111. Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,240.
112. 502 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
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second restitution order, against Holiday Magic, Inc. (a de-
ceptive pyramid marketing scheme), deferentially stating its
disagreement with the Ninth Circuit and its intent to seek
Supreme Court review of Heater."3 But it then reopened the
Holiday Magic case, announced that it was dropping its re-
quest for Supreme Court review of Heater, and dropped the
restitution portion of the Holiday Magic order."'
The reason for the FTC's turnabout was clear: there was
serious doubt the Supreme Court would-or should-reverse
the Ninth Circuit; in addition, Congress had come to the
rescue, in part, by enacting the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, which was
signed into law on January 4, 1975. 15 Among other things that
Act added a new section 19 to the FTC Act expressly authoriz-
ing the Commission to seek judicial restitution remedies in
certain cases. In the language of the Act, the relief sought by
the Commission "may include, but shall not be limited to...
the refund of money or return of property [and] the payment
of damages . "... ,116
The statutory addition may be a mixed blessing. It re-
solves questions of the Commission's authority to seek restitu-
tion for consumers, but it specifies this power for only two types
of misconduct: violations of a trade regulation rule and viola-
tions of an actual cease and desist order applicable to that
respondent."' Thus, for the Commission to seek consumer re-
dress under section 19 it must first have promulgated a rule or
entered an order proscribing the respondent's activities with
some specificity. In addition, a restitutionary remedy may be
ordered by the court only where the proscribed conduct is such
113. Holiday Magic, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
11 20,757. In its footnote 11 to this order the Commission stated:
The Commission is fully aware of the decision by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals declaring that it may not order restitution of retained
monies obtained as a result of violations of the FTC Act occurring prior to
the entry of a cease-and-desist order. . . .With all due respect for the court,
the Commission believes that the court's decision in this matter is incorrect,
and the Commission will seek to obtain review of this decision by the Su-
preme Court.
Id. 11 20,757, at 20,617.
114. Id. 11 20,819.
115. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, tit. U1, Pub. L. No. 93-
637, 88 Stat. 2545 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-57c (1970)).
116. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (1976).
117. Id. §§ 19(a)(1)-(2), 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)-b(b).
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that "a reasonable man would have known under the Circum-
stances [that it] was dishonest or fraudulent.'"'
There may be a further loophole in the statutory "redress"
provision. It is unclear on the face of the statute whether resti-
tution can be ordered only with respect to conduct occurring
after entry of a cease and desist order or whether, once an order
has been entered, the Commission may then seek redress with
respect to all past conduct of the same kind. One authority'"'
seems to assume that suits for consumer redress cannot have
an ex post facto effect-that is, the Commission may only sue
for redress for conduct occurring after an existing order has
been violated. The Commission, however, apparently assumes
the right to seek restitution even for past conduct which be-
comes subject to an order, provided of course that the respon-
dent had reason to know it was "dishonest or fraudulent" at the
time. 120
Unless the Commission's interpretation of the Act is cor-
rect, creditors will be immune from an award of restitutionary
relief so long as they can avoid the entry of a final cease and
desist order. Restitution would hinge altogether on the timing
of that final order. In this form "consumer redress" would be a
hollow sanction. A final resolution of this ambiguity must
await judicial review, but despite some' unfortunate grammar
in the statutory amendment, a plausible reading of it supports
the propriety of retroactive awards. 2' Should a court conclude
118. Id. § 19(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2).
119. D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 36, at 106. But see Kintner &
Smith, supra note 37, at 684, who suggest that the legislative history of the consumer
redress provision permits retroactive awards.
120. The Commission has filed two court actions under Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57 (1976), in both of which they appear to be seeking refunds
for acts committed prior to entry of a final cease and desist order. FTC v. Las Animas
Ranch, Inc., [19781 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,377; FTC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., [1978J 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,378.
121. Section 19(a)(2) provides that the Commission may seek consumer redress
if a person engages in acts or practices with respect to which "the Commission has
issued a final cease and desist order." (emphasis added.) This language suggests there
can be no retroactive award. But subsection (b) goes on to authorize the courts to
award redress for injury resulting from "the unfair or deceptive act or practice"-that
is, not limited to injury resulting from the violation of the order, which would be the
appropriate language if redress was limited to post-order activities. It is this latter
phrasing that is used with respect to redress for violations of trade regulation rules
("injury ... resulting from the rule violation"), and the lack of symmetry seems
intended.
In addition, the statute of limitations for redress runs for three years "after the
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otherwise and vitiate the statutory remedy, the Commission
would be left to try to resurrect its inherent equitable power to
order restitution-a power the Ninth Circuit has denied it has,
and which the Commission has declined to assert openly since
Heater. 122
Where a public agency like the FTC can force violators to
disgorge ill-gotten gains, that remedy does more than merely
reimburse consumers for their losses. It provides more efficient
and uniform relief than individual consumers could collect on
their own. It also serves as a powerful deterrent to creditors who
skirt the edges of permissible conduct, and it provides a more
effective tool than private enforcement could ever be to deal
with the "fly-by-night" or "get-rich-quick," scheme that
milks one area for all it is worth and then moves on. But even
these advantages are diluted somewhat by the realization that
an agency's legal authority to compel refunds does not assure
that the violator's assets will not have been dissipated through
a corporate spider web or into private pockets.
Bank Regulatory Agencies
The unique relationship between the bank regulatory
agencies and their "constituencies" has been mentioned above.
The regulators' dominant concern for bank safety and sound-
ness has led to a rather easy-going approach to enforcement,
in which consumer credit law violations which turn up in the
course of bank examinations or in response to consumer com-
rule violation ...or the unfair or deceptive act or practice" for which an order is
issued. It would be curious to measure the time for commencing an action from the
occurrence of the unlawful act if the critical time reference were the issuance of an
order. Still further, redress is available only where the conduct is such that a reasona-
ble man would have known it to be dishonest or fraudulent, an odd qualification to
place on conduct occurring after, and in the face of, an explicit cease and desist order.
That the consumer redress mechanism does extend to conduct occurring before,
and becoming subject to, a cease and desist order is supported in the legislative history.
See CONP. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NFws 7772-73.
122. Though not overtly ordering restitution in any contested cases since 1974, the
Commission has included refund requirements in a number of consent orders dealing
with retained credit balances. See, e.g., The Diners' Club, Inc., [19781 3 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 21,269. And in another case involving credit balances, the Commission
issued a final order requiring the creditor to notify prior customers of their right to a
refund of retained balances. (The operative mandate is to give notice, not to repay
money.) Genesco, Inc., [1977] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,319. This latter case
comes perilously close to a restitution order on the Commission's own authority.
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plaints are generally dealt with in an informal manner, without
the initiation of any formal administrative proceedings. In
some respects this preoccupation with matters other than con-
sumer protection is understandable in the bank agencies. Bank
solvency (depositor and investor protection) was their tradi-
tional concern; consumer protection (for borrowers) was an
alien notion for which bank examiners and other agency offi-
cials were generally untrained. Against this background it is
not surprising that the bank agencies routinely reported "high
levels of compliance'!2 3 with Truth in Lending and similar
laws: unseen violations do not count.
Congressional prodding has now stirred up, some action
amongthe federal bank agencies. For one, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act di-
rected each bank agency to establish a consumer complaint
office;' it also directs the Federal Reserve Board to issue regu-
lations defining "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" by
banks and requires the Board to issue companion rules to those
issued by the FTC for other creditors. 25 For another, congres-
sional oversight hearings echoed the general findings of the
NCCF Report, to the effect that the bank agencies showed far
too little aggressiveness in enforcing consumer credit laws. '2
Particular concern was voiced at the agencies' failure to seek
restitution or refunds of actual overcharges, and a mandate for
the bank agencies to order such reimbursements was contained
in a pending Truth in Lending simplification bill2 7 which
passed the Senate in 1978.
123. The Federal Reserve Board's annual reports to Congress on Truth in Lending
for the years 1972 through 1975 all reported "substantial compliance" with that Act.
Not until its 1976 report did the Board acknowledge "fairly numerous instances" of
violations among national banks and "a significant incidence of noncompliance"
among state banks. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, TRUTH IN
LENDING ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1976, at 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REPORT]. By this time the federal agencies had been
dragged on the rug before congressional oversight committees for their lax enforce-
ment. See generally, Oversight Hearings on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal
Banking Agencies Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings],
124. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1) (1976), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2545.
125. Id.
126. S. REP. No. 94-1388, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 95-280, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
127. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(b) (1978); see S. REP. No. 95-720, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1978).
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Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the agencies have re-
acted. The three major bank regulators (the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) have initiated special programs for
training bank examiners in the details of consumer credit
laws. 1  All three agencies have begun conducting separate con-
sumer compliance examinations, and the Comptroller actually
ordered refunds of overcharges in some cases."'2
More recently the three bank agencies, plus the Federal
* Home Loan Bank Board and the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration, have issued a set of uniform guidelines for their
enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act.' 3 The accompanying
announcement said that the guidelines were intended to
"promote improved and uniform enforcement . . .through
corrective action, including reimbursement, for borrowers who
have been overcharged or otherwise harmed by violations of the
Act."'' 3' The guidelines suggest the agencies mean business. For
examples, in closed-end credit transactions where the annual
percentage rate is understated, the creditor would have to re-
fund any finance charge in excess of the disclosed rate;':" if no
APR were disclosed the creditor would have to refund a portion
of the actual rate imposed;' if credit insurance options or
premiums were mis-disclosed, either the consumers would get
a right to cancel including a refund of all the premium paid,
or the insurance would be treated as required, with the prem-
iums constituting an overcharge. 3 1
These guidelines are a momentous step for the federal
bank regulators; the message to the banks is clear. No longer
can they expect a fraternal handshake and a "go and sin no
more" reaction from their regulators. In addition, the financial
128. 1977 TRUTH IN LENDING ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 7-8.
129. See generally the testimony of the three bank regulatory agencies in Hearings
on S. 1312, S. 1501, and S. 1633 before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Banking, House and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as TIL Simplification Hearings].
130. The guidelines were originally proposed in November, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg.
55,786 (1977). At this writing there is substantial agreement among the five agencies
on the form of the final guidelines, but they have not yet been published in the Federal
Register.
131. Id.
132. Guidelines § 4(a) (Nov. 1977).
133. Id. § 4(b).
134. Id. § 6.
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exposure for banks could be substantial. Consider, hypotheti-
cally, a bank which has inadvertently miscalculated (and so
understated) the APR in all of its personal, auto, and mortgage
loans for the past year, or-even worse-in all its loans since
1974, the cut-off date for the guidelines. The bank could be
required to refund millions of dollars in excess charges.
The federal agencies have also issued proposed guide-
lines' for the enforcement of Regulation B (implementing the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act). That regulation deals with
credit discrimination rather than cost disclosure, and restitu-
tion is not the appropriate remedy in most cases since viola-
tions do not produce a measurable overcharge. The Regulation
B guidelines, as proposed, therefore stress other corrective rem-
edies- "affirmative advertising" directed at previously dis-
couraged classes of applicants, publicity for nondiscriminatory
loan policies, and reevaluation of previously rejected appli-
cants in accordance with nondiscriminatory standards. Even
here, however, there is an element of the restitution idea, for
creditors will be required to refund fees and prepayment penal-
ties incurred by the customer in taking the new loan.
At least a few state bank supervisors are emulating their
federal counterparts. 3 Certainly some state banking commis-
sioners have been actively pressing the enforcement of con-
sumer protection laws, and it is likely that patterns of ordering
restitution established by the federal agencies will more and
more become models for state activity.
4. Notification to Consumers: Publicity for Violators
There has been of late some considerable discussion and
controversy over the desirability of having public agencies dis-
close or otherwise publicize the existence of violations discov-
ered by those agencies through investigations or examinations.
135. The proposed guidelines were published simultaneously by the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board; and the National Credit Union Administra-
tion in July 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 (1978). These guidelines have been less controver-
sial than those for TIL enforcement and will likely be adopted by the time this article
appears.
136. Several state officials have instituted a policy of ordering rebates of over-
charges. See Advisory Opinion #1 of the Maine Bureau of Consumer Protection, set
out in TIL Simplification Hearings, supra note 129, at 415, and testimony of Carol S.
Greenwald, Massachusetts Comm'r of Banks, id. at 366-67.
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The same provision of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act that authorized the
Commission to seek consumer redress in court also authorized
the courts to give relief in the form of "public notification re-
specting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act of
practice.' '1 3 Presumably this contemplates some form of spe-
cific or generalized publicity about the case, beyond what
would appear in court records. Since no judgments have been
entered under that section yet, examples of what courts will do
must abide the event.
Some members of Congress have proposed 3 giving the
federal enforcement agencies themselves discretionary author-
ity to publicize violators of the Truth in Lending Act, but this
provision did not survive the Senate Banking Committee's con-
solidated markup of several TIL simplication bills. As an indi-
cator of agency attitudes toward this device, the Comptroller
of the Currency vigorously-and successfully-resisted a
Freedom of Information Act request, from Consumers Union,
for the identity of banks detected in noncompliance with Truth
in Lending, on grounds of confidentiality.'39 At the other ex-
treme, at least one state credit code administrator has adopted
the policy of routinely notifying affected consumers of viola-
tions discovered in the course of creditor examinations. 4)
Several distinct enforcement purposes are served by noti-
fying consumers or by giving some general notoriety to viola-
tors. Obviously, consumers will be "notified" whenever the en-
forcement agency orders corrective action as to them. Individ-
ual consumers conceivably might then press for private reme-
dies, but if the agency also has ordered corrective action the
creditor may genuinely complain of double jeopardy. It is diffi-
cult to justify, for example, awarding the consumer twice the
finance charge in a transaction for which the creditor has al-
ready refunded the excess charge at the behest of the supervi-
sory agency.14 ' On the other hand, a consumer who is notified
137. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (1976).
138. S. 1312, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1977).
139. Consumers Union v. Heimann, 47 U.S.L.W. 2167 (1978).
140. Testimony of John Quinn, Maine Bureau of Consumer Protection, Oversight
Hearings, supra note 123, at 44.
141. A possible solution would be to reduce any individual consumer's judgment
award by the amount of any agency-ordered restitution. See the Maine Advisory Opin-
ion #1, supra note 136. But this would seem to require some corresponding statutory
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by agency officials of his continuing right to rescind a transac-
tion may properly choose to exercise that right. Public embar-
rassment of creditors, through press-release publicity, may pro-
vide some incentive toward compliance, but as one United
States senator pointed out in the Banking Committee markup
of such a proposal, it is rather inconsistent to prohibit creditors
from publishing "shame lists" of defaulting consumers (as is
provided in the recent Fair Debt Collection Practices Act" ' )
but invite enforcement agencies to do just that to defaulting
creditors.
Judiciously used, publicity may be a valuable auxiliary
weapon for public agencies. The ground rules thus far enacted
or proposed may not be sufficient safeguards to prevent misuse
of the technique, but the very experimental nature of the pub-
licity tool makes any attempt at final evaluation mere conjec-
ture.
5. Trade Regulation Rules
For an enforcement agency like the FTC, whose resources
can never permit it to keep day-to-day track of the activities
of all the creditors subject to its jurisdiction, nor prosecute all
.violators on a case-by-case basis, an effective alternative (or
supplementary) enforcement technique might lie in the issu-
ance of rules having the force of law and setting out with preci-
sion what is unlawful conduct. In theory at least, such rules
would provide guidance and certainty for creditors and would
ease the agency's prosecution burdens by eliminating the need
to prove deception or unfairness in individual cases. Also, if one
assumes that the mere promulgation of standards will induce
most law-abiding creditors to conform their practices accord-
ingly, the issuance of trade regulation rules can be a very effi-
cient enforcement mechanism.
This thinking led the Commission to begin issuing such
rules in the 1960's.4 3 Since this enforcement mode was novel,
and involved the agency's arrogating to itself the powers of a
amendment to the private civil penalty provisions. The Senate-passed Truth in Lend-
ing simplification bill, S. 2802, is therefore incomplete in failing to integrate agency
restitution powers with private remedies.
142. Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 806(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692d(3) (West Supp. 1978).
143. D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 36, at 121-35, reviews the origin of
these rules.
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mini-legislature, it was inevitable that an affected industry
would challenge the FTC's authority to promulgate binding
trade regulation rules. The now famous case was National Pe-
troleum Refiners Association v. FTC.4" At issue was an FTC
rule requiring the posting of gasoline octane ratings at service
station pumps. In a lengthy review of the legislative history of
the FTC Act, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the Commission's rule-making authority.
To remove any further doubt, Congress in 1975 amended
section 18 of the FTC Act to give the Commission explicit
power to issue rules,"5 althoughlonly via an elaborate adminis-
trative hearing process."8 While there can no longer be any
question of the Commission's basic authority in this regard, it
is worth noting and evaluating the kinds of rules they have
issued affecting consumer credit transactions.
The two existing rules with major impact in the credit area
were both issued on the Commission's own authority rather
than under the aegis of amended section 18. The first deals
with door-to-door sales and seeks to assure that consumers
have a chance to change their minds, to cool off."7 The rule is
not limited to credit transactions, though it generally parallels
the Truth in Lending provisions requiring notice and a right of
rescission in certain real estate credit transactions. The me-
chanics of the rule spell out a contractual provision and disclo-
sure which door-to-door sellers must incorporate in their agree-
ments and which then becomes a more or less self-executing
part of the contract between seller and buyer." 8 Sellers who
violate this rule are obviously subject to Commission prosecu-
tion, but perhaps not to consumer redress under new section 19
of the FTC Act."' In light of the prevailing view that there is
no private right of action for violation of the FTC Act, it is
144. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1973).
145. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(a)(1)(B) (1970), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2545.
146. Id. § 18(b)-(e).
147. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1974).
148. Id. § 429.1(b).
149. This qualification is due to the fact that consumer redress under new section
19 lies for violation of "any rule under this Act," which may limit the remedy to
violations of rules issued under the specific statutory mandate in section 18. The door-
to-door sales rule, of course, was issued under the Commission's general authority as
confirmed in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1973).
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unclear what the position of an individual consumer would be
if the seller violates the rule. In a case construing the rule,' 5'
however, the court granted the consumer the right to rescind
without even acknowledging the precedents barring private re-
lief.
The other credit-oriented rule is that on "Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses"' 5 -effectively abolishing
the holder-in-due-course doctrine. Again the technique used
is to require creditors to incorporate into consumer credit
agreements provisions that affirmatively preserve consumer
rights against subsequent holtiers of those obligations. Under
the current version of this rule the compliance burden is placed
exclusively on sellers, even with respect to "purchase money
loans' 151 2 made by banks or others. In this, the rule has the
effect of expanding the Commission's jurisdiction somewhat,
for while the FTC cannot directly regulate banks this rule sub-
jects them to immense practical pressure to cooperate with
sellers by including the specified language in notes and other
loan agreements. At the same time the present holder rule was
promulgated, in November 1975, the Commission proposed an
amendment which would extend the compliance duty to any
third-party creditors who took consumer obligations from sell-
ers. 53 Should this amendment be adopted, the Federal Reserve
Board would then be required to adopt a companion rule for
banks.'54
Industry reaction, especially to the "holder" rule, has been
extremely hostile. A suit was brought to enjoin the rule from
going into effect;155 several bills, were introduced in Congress to
repeal it.151 These efforts collapsed, and at this writing none of
industry's dire predictions about the effects of the rule appear
to have materialized. The, animosity to FTC rule-making con-
tinues, however. In the recent Fair Debt Collection Practices
150. Donnelly v. Mustang Pools, Inc., 84 Misc. 2d 28, 374 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct.
1975).
151. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
152. Id. §§ 433.1(d), 433.2(b). The phrase includes direct loans made by lenders
to finance specific purchases from dealers with whom the lender maintains referral or
affiliation relationships.
153. 40 Fed. Reg. 5350 (1975).
154. This is by virtue of the mandate for parallel rules now contained in section
18(f)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 57(f)(1) (1976).
155. National Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. FTC, 421 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. La. 1976).
156. S. 3652, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 13,897, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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Act, the industry fought hard for, and won, a provision ex-
pressly barring the FTC from increasing the restrictions on
debt collectors through regulations or trade regulation rules.'57
Now the entire credit industry has mobilized in opposition to
the proposed Credit Practices Rule for which the Commission
has conducted more than fifty days of hearings around the
country.
Industry distaste for rule-making is based on several
grounds. Creditors object to the broad nature of the rules and
to the ambiguities and lack of precision in them. They object
in principle to administrative '"egislation" by unelected com-
missioners. And they question whether the rules reflect realis-
tic assessments by the Commission of the compliance burden
and of the anti-competitive impact of these restrictions on
creditor rights. The other side of the coin, of course, is that the
Commission's expertise and market contacts give it an ideal
perspective from which to gauge the need for rule-making and
the form it should take. Change through legislation at the fed-
eral level is slow, it is said, and may be influenced by political
motivations and compromises, while rule-making is a more
flexible, responsive device.
No ultimate answer to this philosophical debate is possi-
ble. So long as the Commission continues to promulgate rules,
their existence is a reality. And there are inducements in the
FTC Improvements Act which will likely keep the pipeline
flowing: violations of trade regulation rules trigger the availa-
bility of consumer redress. 15 In addition the Commission may
sue any person who violates a rule for civil penalties of $10,000
per violation without the intermediate step of an administra-
tive adjudication. 59 Thus the existence of a trade regulation
rule strengthens the agency's hand in other ways beyond the
automatic compliance it produces.
Similar kinds of guidelines have emerged from other fed-
eral agencies. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, for exam-
ple, has adopted regulatory rules and underwriting guidelines
to deal with the housing discrimination pattern called
"redlining."' 160 The Comptroller of the Currency has issued a
157. 15 U.S.C.A. § 16921(d) (West Supp. 1978).
158. Federal Trade Commission Act § 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1) (1976).
159. Id. § 5(m)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 45m(1)(A).
160. 12 C.F.R. § 531.8 (1978) (as amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 22,332).
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regulation forbidding bank officials from reaping the profits
from credit insurance"'-an indirect attack on the overpricing
of such coverages. And, in the states, little FTC acts have
included rule-writing authority for the administrator.1
2
The significance of agency rules as prospective enforce-
ment devices is growing, especially as the FTC continues to
engage in this activity. Federal Trade Commission rules auto-
matically create uniform national standards, bypassing state
legislatures, and if broad rules such as that proposed by the
Commission for Credit Practices are adopted, the effective reg-
ulation of consumer credit transactions will have almost wholly
shifted into federal hands.
6. Other Quasi-Enforcement Techniques
Two other types of enforcement agency activity bear men-
tion here, though they do not directly involve the policing of
creditor conduct. One type is the conduct of educational pro-
grams by the agencies, with the goal of simply making consum-
ers more informed of their rights in, and the terms of, credit
transactions. Probably every agency engages in this activity to
some extent, by providing speakers for public programs, or by
preparing and distributing brochures or similar material
through the schools, through creditor outlets, or by direct mail
in response to inquiries. 3 There is evidence that some enforce-
ment agencies are making a special effort in this regard-a
noteworthy example being the "DownEaster's Pocket Credit
Guide" distributed by the Maine Department of Consumer
Protection. 164
A bill'6 5 introduced in the Senate as part of the Truth in
Lending simplification effort would have required the Federal
Reserve Board to collect and disseminate prevailing credit
rates in order to educate consumers, but the provision was
scaled back to a one-shot demonstration project in the final
161. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,846 (1976).
162. E.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAIcEs Acr § 6(b).
163. See Testimony of James A. McCaffrey, Deputy Administrator, Oklahoma
Dep't of Consumer Affairs, in TIL Simplification Hearings, supra note 129, at 383, 390.
164. See Testimony of John E. Quinn, Superintendent, Maine Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, id. at 405-06. The "Guide" describes how to shop for credit and also
contains a series of tables showing at a glance the actual cost of credit at various
interest rates and terms.
165. S. 1312, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1977).
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Senate bill. 66 One difficulty with this proposal is feasibility: it
would take massive efforts to collect, verify, collate, and pub-
lish the data, and as guides to prevailing rates the data would
probably be out of date before consumers saw it. More general-
ized, explanatory information, however, should have a cumula-
tive effect over time in raising the level of consumer sensitivity
to legal rights, and it is the informed consumer who is likely to
initiate "enforcement" action, either on his own or by com-
plaining to a public agency.
A last technique appears where enforcement officials seek
declaratory judgments concerning the applicability and scope
of consumer credit laws. An instance is the recent series of
cases in which state attorneys general have successfully sought
declarations that local consumer protection laws are applicable
to out-of-state creditors who deal with local residents. In
Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 16 7 the leading case, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals sustained the argument of the Wisconsin
Attorney General that Wisconsin statutes applied to open-end
credit agreements between the Chicago mail order house and
Wisconsin residents, despite the fact that all transactions were
solicited from Chicago and the agreements were accepted
there. Obviously the applicable Wisconsin laws are more favor-
able for consumers than those invoked by the creditor in Illi-
nois, so the result of the holding is to establish a firmer base
from which individual consumers or local consumer protection
agencies can assert rights and remedies against the creditor-
rights and remedies that would remain clouded absent the de-
claratory judgment.
Like education, obtaining judicial clarification of applica-
ble laws is not a direct enforcement technique. But its efficient
resolution of an otherwise debatable threshold question allows
.other enforcement weapons to operate more freely.
V. A RATIONALE FOR EXPANSIVE AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
The 1978 defeat of the proposed new Federal Agency for
Consumer Advocacy (the "Consumer Protection Agency,"
which has been the major goal of consumerists for many years)
166. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 18 (1978).
167. 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977). See also Aldens,
Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Aldens, Inc. v. Kane,
425 U.S. 943 (1976).
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evidences at least political and industry reluctance to add to
the strata of governmental bureaucracy. If the answer to better
enforcement of consumer protection laws lies neither in creat-
ing new agencies nor in continued tinkering with the induce-
ments to private enforcement, some substantial gains may al-
ready have been realized in the development of new techniques
for existing agencies.
Without arguing for, or assuming, the need for increased
budgets or staffs for existing federal and state agencies, their
judicious use of new and alternative enforcement devices can
contribute to more flexible, adaptive, consistent enforcement
strategies. This may be especially true in the consumer credit
area, which is already crisscrossed with federal and state laws
and rules and where creditors acting in good faith face compli-
ance responsibilities with no real certainty they can cross every
"t" and dot every "i." Even further is this true with respect to
the credit area if one acknowledges that "violations" are often
technical, and actual consumer damage speculative, factors
which depress motivations for private enforcement except in
unusual settings like Truth in Lending.
Deterrence and prevention are primary goals of any en-
forcement scheme, for consumers should be entitled to law-
abiding conduct from creditors and should not have to worry
about extricating themselves from the consequences of unlaw-
ful practices. A number of the newly developed agency tech-
niques lend themselves readily to these goals (and do so far
better than the traditional cease and desist order device): trhde
regulation rule writing is the strongest example, but all the
devices discussed above have the capacity to promote compli-
ance to some degree. And however wrenching were the FTC's
"holder" rule, or the Seventh Circuit's decision in LaFollette,
to the creditors affected by them, one can at least believe that
the costs and burdens of adjusting to those new standards are
somewhat offset by the savings in private litigation over those
same issues.
The major new departure is the ability of public agencies
to order "consumer redress"-specific refunds of money, prop-
erty, or the like to customers. With this power, agencies can
make a real dent in the need for extensive private litigation,
which heretofore has been virtually the exclusive route to a
private remedy. Prompt agency action, including the attach-
ment or freezing of creditor assets, can assure a source of recov-
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ery for consumers in cases where they might otherwise have
been left with uncollectible judgments. Agency proceedings for
restorative relief also avoid the complexities and court burdens
incident to private class actions or multiple individual actions.
The availability of an array of enforcement weapons for
the public agency may have other beneficial, though less tangi-
ble, effects. An agency may now effectively combine deterrent
and corrective relief in a single proceeding, thus bridging what
were previously distinct agency and private enforcement roles.
The introduction of specific compliance duties into agency or-
ders or rules may in fact give creditors protection against sub-
sequent challenges in private litigation. The very process of
developing trade regulation rules through open hearings, with
cross-examination, and with financial support for the partici-
pation of appropriate consumer representatives,' may reduce
polarization between consumer and industry camps-or at
least improve the dialogue between them.
To all of this, several final words-somewhat in the na-
ture of a caveat lector-must be added. The thesis of this
paper is that the range of enforcement techniques currently
being used by various enforcement agencies has, collectively,
the potential for giving public agencies a much improved role
in the implementation of consumer credit laws. The writer as-
sumes neither that we have already reached that ideal, nor that
the course to it is obstacle-free.
Probably no single existing agency, state or federal, has
experimented with all the described techniques. It is therefore
impossible to say how effective the whole complement would
be within a single enforcement jurisdiction. In addition, the
existence of new enforcement methods does nothing to reduce
the fragmentation of enforcement responsibility through fed-
eral, state, and local agencies. Frictions attributable to juris-
dictional overlaps, or gaps, will continue.' So too, probably,
168. Recent amendments to the FTC Act permit the Commission to compensate
consumer representatives or others for expenses of participating in rule-making pro-
ceedings. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(h), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1970), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2545.
169. For example, the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks has engaged in a
heated, three-cornered debate over her authority to enforce state consumer protection
laws against federally-chartered banks and thrift institutions. See Testimony and
Statement of Carol S. Greenwald, TIL Simplification Hearings, supra note 127, at 359-
90.
[Vol. III
New Directions in Enforcement
will the shortage of resources for many agencies.
A more serious possible impediment to optimum use of
new enforcement techniques is inherent in their flexible, dis-
cretionary nature. The danger is that the agencies simply will
not use good judgment-that they will lapse back into cozy
relationships with the industries they supervise or, at the other
extreme, that they will view themselves as crusaders carrying
on a holy war for every conceivable consumer advantage. No
paper charter of enforcement options can prevent excesses in
their under-use or over-use. The good judgment of any en-
forcement agency is probably the end product of its tradition,
its statutory mandates, and the aggregate good sense of its
current personnel. At times a given agency may need to be
coaxed or ordered into a more active role; at other times legis-
lative or executive brakes may need to be applied. These
considerations do not, however, undercut the conclusion that
public agencies equipped with better enforcement tools can
better serve the public good.
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